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In neighborhoods mostly peopled by low-income groups ,  ethnic mi­
norities and immigrant communities, access to regular bank services is 
often difficult and fraught with many obstacles .  When they need a short­
term loan, many of these customers will fall back on alternative financial 
services and visit either a payday lender, a pawnshop, a check-cashing 
outlet, a rent-to-own store or another similar kind of business .  
This alternative or "fringe banking" sector has been developing and 
consolidating rapidly over the past two decades and its rate of growth is 
spectacular: in 2009, there were almost 23 ,000 payday lenders nation­
wide against a mere 200 in the early nineties .  Likewise, the number of 
pawnshops almost tripled between 1 985 and 2006, climbing from 4,500 
to almost 1 2,000. In 2008, the Brookings Institution listed 48,000 of 
these non-bank establishments ,  versus slightly over 1 00,000 bank and 
credit union branches, and the number of online transactions is booming 
(estimates reckon that by 20 1 6, 60% of total payday loans will take place 
online against 35% in 201 1 ) . 1 
One of the first to draw national attention to the size of this parallel 
economy was economist John Caskey in 1 995 with his book Fringe 
Banking, which was followed ten years later by social policy analyst 
Howard Karger' s  Shortchanged: Life & Debt in the Fringe Economy 
(2005) .  Since then, a whole body of literature on the topic has emerged, 
denouncing both the usurious and discriminatory practices of this sector 
but also the failure of regular banks to draw these customers back into 
their fold. 
In 2009, the FDIC released its "National Survey of Unbanked and 
Underbanked2 Households", the first of its kind to analyze on a national 
scale those households who fall through the cracks of the mainstream 
1 Daniel Brook, Harper's Magazine, April 2009, p.43 ; Brookings Institution, "Banking 
on Wealth: America' s New Retail Banking Infrastructure and Its Wealth-Building Potential", 
January 2008; "Major Banks Aid in Payday Loans Banned by States", New York Times, Febru­
ary 23 20 1 3 .  
2 The underbanked are people who have a checking or saving account but use non-bank 
money orders, check cashing services, payday loans, etc . at least once a year. 
2 1 1 
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banking system.3 Its findings, later confirmed in a follow-up study for 
201 1 -20 1 2  (which showed a worsening picture, +0.6% in the proportion 
of unbanked households, and + 1 .9% for the underbanked) were quite dis­
tressing (figure 1 ) :  
> 25.6% of U.S .  households, about 30 million, are ei­
ther unbanked (9 million) or underbanked (2 1 mil­
lion), i.e. more than 60 million adults . These 
households have no or little relationship with a bank, 
savings institution, credit union, or any other main­
stream financial service provider. 
> Minority populations are disproportionately repre­
sented since almost 54% of black households are ei­
ther unbanked (22%) or underbanked (32%),  while 
43 .3% of Hispanic households and 44.5% of Ameri­
can Indian! Alaskan households fall into this cate­
gory. The figure for white households is of 1 8% 
only. 
> Households where Spanish is the only language spo­
ken at home are also more likely to be unbanked 
(35 .6%),  as are households where the householder is 
a foreign-born noncitizen (2 1 .9%) 
> In a number of areas, particularly in the South re­
gion, estimated minority unbanked and underbanked 
proportions substantially exceed the national  
estimate. 
> Last but not least, a substantial proportion of un-
banked households were previously banked. 
This survey confirmed previous findings, in particular the 2004 Working 
Paper from the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University 
which had already pointed out that the "unbanked" were overwhelmingly 
African-American and Hispanic, less educated, less affluent and younger 
than the population as a whole .4 
Taking a look at the reasons given by these households for being 
unbanked or underbanked is very instructive : 
3 FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, December 2009, 
http ://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/full_report.pdf; see also the 201 1 survey, http ://www. 
fdic.gov/householdsurveyI20 1 2_unbankedreport.pdf; and Howard Karger, "America' s Grow­
ing Fringe Economy", Dollars & Sense November/December 2006; Howard Karger, "The 
Modern Fringe Economy", The Social Policy Journal, vol. 3 ( 1 )  2004 ; and The Unbanked, fact 
sheet, University of Minnesota, 2006. 
4 Christopher Barry, "To Bank or Not to Bank? A Survey of Low-Income Households", 
Joint Center for Housing Studies Working Paper Series, BABC 04-3 .  February 2004. 
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FIGURE 1 .  COMPARISON OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED 
HOUSEHOLDS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 
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> 37% say they don ' t  have enough money to need an 
account 
> 1 8% don ' t  write enough checks 
> 1 2% complain the minimum balance requirement is 
too high 
> 1 2% do not need or want an account! did not see 
value of an account 
> 9% say banks do not feel comfortable or welcoming 
> 6.9% complain of language barriers 
> 6 .3% do not trust banks 
> 5 .5% have a legal status problem, or are unable to 
provide required residency documentation 
White 
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Most of these factors reveal a deep disconnect with mainstream banks, 
and speak of a profound distrust toward businesses perceived as essen­
tially catering to well-off and savvy customers. The unbanked over­
whelmingly consider banks as hostile environments , ill-adapted to their 
needs and untrustworthy. In a 2004 Homeownership Alliance study of 
barriers to banking for Latin Americans,  U.S .  banks were called insecure, 
unsafe, unforgiving, unwelcoming, inflexible, and intimidating environ­
ments with language barriers .  The same study suggested that more His­
panics would open bank accounts if the matricula consular card was 
more easily accepted for identification, if banks were flexible in mini-
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mum balance expectations, and if remittance rates were reasonably 
priced. 
There is a great deal of self-censorship also: many unbanked people 
have simply integrated the notion that they don ' t  need or deserve a bank 
account, let alone a credit which they fear will be rejected anyway . Other 
research on perceptions of creditworthiness reveals that African Ameri­
cans in particular tend to be overly pessimistic about their credit scores, 
and are convinced they needn ' t  bother ask a prime lender for a loan,  
because it will almost certainly be denied. 
The alternative, then, is to turn to alternative financial services,  aka 
fringe banking . Over 60% of unbanked households regularly visit a pay­
day outlet, a check-cashing store, a pawnshop, and other similar busi­
nesses when they need to borrow small amounts of money and get cash 
fast. And what appears very clearly is that these fringe businesses have 
developed proactive, deliberate strategies of expansion toward ethnic and 
immigrant communities . There is indeed a disproportionate number of 
these outlets in relation to regular bank agencies in areas with large con­
centrations of minority and immigrant communities. 5 
In 2005 , 2008 and 2009, the Center for Responsible Lending carried 
out three studies on payday lender locations in several states - North 
Carolina, Arizona, Texas and California. All three reached the same con­
clusions : minority neighborhoods (defined by the census tracts , i .e .  areas 
comprising between 2,500 and 8,000 people), especially those with large 
African American, Latino, or Native American popUlations, were found 
to have three to eight times as many payday lending stores per capita as 
white neighborhoods (table 1 ) .  In California, while African Americans,  
Latinos, and Native Americans make up about a third (35%) of the adult 
population, they represent 56% of all payday borrowers. In Texas, 
Blacks and Hispanics represent 40% of the adult population, yet 77% of 
all payday borrowers .6 It is undeniable that race and ethnicity were dom­
inant factors in the decision of these fringe banks to settle in these 
neighborhoods . 
One interesting finding is that even when both mainstream banks 
and fringe banking outlets co-exist in the same neighborhoods - which 
means these customers therefore have a choice - the unbankedlun­
derbanked often deliberately choose the fringe banking outlets over the 
5 Mark L. Burkey and Scott P. Simkins, "Factors Affecting the Location of Payday 
Lending and Traditional Banking Services in North Carolina" Review of Regional Studies, vol. 
34 no. 2, Fall 2004, p . 1 9 l -205 ; Assaf Oron, "Easy Prey: Evidence for Race and Military 
Related Targeting in the Distribution of Payday Loan Branches in Washington State", Depart­
ment of Statistics, University of Washington, March 2006. 
6 Wealth-Stripping Payday Loans Trouble Communities of Color, Center for Responsi­
ble Lending October 2, 2008.  
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TABLE 1 
COMMUNITIES OF COLOR MAKE UP HIGHER PROPERTIONS OF 
BORROWERS IN CALIFORNIA AND TEXAS 
California Texas 
2 1 5  
% of total % of total % of total % of total 
payday adult payday adult 
borrowers population borrowers population 
African American 18% 6% 43% 1 1 % 
Latino 36% 28% 34% 29% 
Native American 2% < 1 %  Not available 
regular mainstream banks .7  Why is that so? Four main reasons can be 
identified: 
> Speedy and convenient transactions.  Fringe outlets 
often act as one-stop shopping centers which offer 
all sorts of commercial services unavailable at the 
local bank. At a check-cashing outlet for instance, 
aside from cashing checks, one can also pay utility 
bills ,  transfer money for remittances8, place money 
orders, buy prepaid long distance calling cards,  cell 
phones and beepers, send and receive a fax, xerox 
documents, buy postage stamps,  envelopes, lottery 
tickets or even keep a mailbox. 
> Easy-to-get loans. To get a payday loan, almost any­
one with a checking account and source of income 
gets approved, even with a poor FICO score (under 
650) ; lenders usually do not conduct credit checks . 
The only paperwork required is a form asking con-
7 John Caskey, "Bank Representation in Low-Income and Minority Urban Communi­
ties", Urban Affairs Review, vo1.29, 1 994, p .6 1 7 .  The author who studied this pattern from 
1 970 to 1 989 in five different cities (Atlanta, Denver, New York, San Jose, Washington D.C.)  
reports that in all five cities, areas with a dominant African-American or Hispanic population 
are substantially less likely to have a local bank compared to other communities but contends 
that this underrepresentation does not necessarily mean banks deliberately avoid minority ar­
eas. Low housing value/ lack of business activity can explain it; see also the National Commu­
nity Reinvestment Coalition, "Are Banks on the Map? An Analysis of B ank Branch Location 
in Working Class and Minority Neighborhoods", 2007 ; and "Predatory Profiling: The Role of 
Race and Ethnicity in the Location of Payday Lenders in California", Center for Responsible 
Lending, March 26, 2009. 
8 A large portion of these transactions does not occur through formal financial institu­
tions. Rather than relying on traditional banks, many immigrants in the United States turn to 
smaller banks and credit unions, private money-transfer services and personal networks to 
send money to friends and relatives in their native country. 70-80% percent of immigrants use 
wire transfer agencies such as Western Union and Moneygram to send money to friends and 
relatives in their home country. 
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tact information about the customer, his/her spouse, 
landlord or mortgage holder, and three acquaint­
ances .  Applicants fill out the form, show proof of 
employment or another source of income such as So­
cial Security, give their bank account number, and 
write a postdated check, dated to their next payday, 
for the loan amount plus the fee . It takes half an hour 
against several days at the bank. It is a form of fast­
food banking. 
> Simplicity : pricing for these short-term loans is de­
ceptively simple. For a payday loan, a fixed interest 
rate of around $ 1 5  to $20 is charged for each $ 1 00 
amount borrowed for a two-week loan, and there are 
no additional charges if the loan is paid back on 
time. It ' s  easy to understand and the cash is available 
on the spot. 
> Personalized attention, friendly clerks and respect of 
sales personnel, trained to make these customers feel 
welcome and who are taught to empathize, the "we 
understand what you' re going through" approach. 
Fringe banking sells itself as credit with a human 
face, contrary to the dehumanizing banks. 
Many of the reasons people use these services are not linked to cost .  The 
fringe banking system exists because it addresses a real need, which 
banks fail to do. These businesses pitch themselves as helping communi­
ties in need, and performing a necessary service which no other business 
cares to offer. In a sense, they are right. They have managed to gain the 
trust of these customers who choose to visit them, even though it may not 
be in their best interest. 
No wonder retail giants are stepping on the bandwagon: Wal-Mart, 
which already had 1 ,800 "MoneyCenters" inside its U .S .  stores ,  where 
shoppers can cash checks, transfer money, buy the WalMart prepaid 
debit card (the MoneyCard) for only $3 (and no overdraft fees) added 
500 more in 20 10 .  
Meanwhile, the real cost of  these credit products is astronomical . 
Asking for a $300 payday loan for example, which comes with a 1 5 %  to 
20% interest rate for a two-week period means writing a check for $360, 
which amounts to annualized interest rates (APR or annual percentage 
rate) of over 400 percent. Because these loans are short-term, involve 
small amounts and are simple to get, most borrowers fail to appreciate 
how expensive they really are. They don ' t  understand the difference be­
tween a percentage rate applied on a two-week loan and the percentage 
rate calculated over an entire year. The payday lending industry is a 
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predatory industry that takes advantage of this assymetric information 
between borrowers and lenders . Even more disheartening, those who do 
know they are getting ripped off feel they have no other solution. What 
matters to people who live paycheck to paycheck is how much they are 
going to be paying weekly and whether they can afford it. Long-term 
strategies are not even an option, and fringe banking thrives on this sense 
of urgency. 
The perversity of the system is that, unlike what the business wants 
us to believe, this service is not designed to help someone in trouble get 
an emergency one-time fix; instead, it is designed to keep the borrowers 
in a cycle of permanent debt. Research has shown that after the two­
week period, most borrowers are unable to pay back their initial loan, but 
instead roll it over into a new one, then a third, all the while paying the 
outlandish $ 1 5  or $20 finance fees each time. Only 25 % of borrowers 
eventually manage to pay off. Meanwhile the average customer takes 
about ten payday loans a year. 
The loan is structured as a trap. Some customers, to save face, take 
out a loan from another payday lender to pay the first and end up with 
multiple lenders to keep track of. The Center for Responsible Lending 
has found that 90 percent of business is generated by borrowers with five 
or more loans a year and over 60 percent of business is generated by 
borrowers with 12 or more loans a year.9 Payday loan losses are about 
6% or less .  A customer who pays off a loan or purchases a good or 
service outright is much less profitable than customers who keep re­
turning for another loan. Most of the profit in the fringe economy lies 
with keeping customers caught in an expensive web of debt. Clearly , 
those who use these services have evolved from occasional users to 
chronic borrowers and payday lending has become a form of twenty­
first century sharecropping. 10 
The other most popular fringe banking services are offered by 
pawnshops ,  car title loans,  tax refund anticipation loans and rent-to-own 
stores .  Pawnshops offer small, short-term loans with personal items, such 
as jewelry or large electronics ,  as collateral. The average pawnshop loan 
is about $75 but can go as low as $ 1 5 .  Interests are as high as 25 percent. 
Loopholes in state usury laws often allow them to rollover fees and fi­
nance charges also. The pawnshop collects the item if the borrower de­
faults on his payment. Pawnshops are less popular in comparison to 
9 Wealth-Stripping Payday Loans Trouble Communities of Color, op.cit. 
1 0 Payday lending is legal and regulated in 37 states. It was first authorized in 1 996. In 
Georgia, North Carolina and 1 1  other states, it is either illegal or not feasible, given state law. 
Yet most of the regulatory efforts to police the sector have been ineffective so far: customers 
simply take back-to-back transactions when renewing the loan immediately is not allowed, and 
cooling-off periods to prevent roll overs are totally artificial as borrowers still take a new loan 
after a few days. 
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payday lenders today because there is no need to leave personal posses­
sions as collateral . Yet, payday loans can inflict potentially greater dam­
age on borrowers . For instance, if a consumer abandons a pawned item, 
the lender retains the collateral and the borrower is not pursued. No re­
port is filed with a collection agency nor is the borrower' s  credit history 
blemished. On the other hand, defaulting on a payday loan will taint the 
creditworthiness of the borrower, if not destroy it. These businesses have 
evolved into a multi-service industry ; some also provide payday loans 
and other financial services .  There were 4,500 pawnshops in the United 
States in 1 985 ; in 2006 they had grown to almost 1 2,000, including out­
lets owned by five publicly traded chains . ! 1 
Car title loans are a variation of the typical pawn loan.  A person 
who owns his/her car can take out a small loan, usually around 25% of 
the value of the car, using the car title as collateral . Repayment is usually 
made over a number of monthly payments, and interest rates are typically 
up to 20% per month. Car title loan contracts are set up so the lender can 
collect the car if the borrower defaults , even on only one payment. Un­
like pawnshop transactions, the consumer does not forego the use of his 
property during the course of the loan, even though the vehicle is techni­
cally owned by the lender until the loan is repaid. 
Tax refund anticipation loans (RALs) are short-term loans secured 
by an expected tax refund. RALs are also expensive and similar to other 
forms of fringe credit with an APR which can range from 67 to over 
700% percent. Of the several million taxpayers who receive RALs, al­
most half get them through H&R Block, the largest tax preparer in the 
nation (Jackson Hewitt is second) . RALs are common in low-income 
neighborhoods, due to tax refunds under the federal EITC program. 
Since taxpayers must file a federal income tax form to receive an EITC 
refund, many use tax preparers and are thus able to get their hands on 
their EITC refund more quickly, unaware that they are in fact getting a 
predatory loan, basically borrowing their own money and paying high 
interest rates for it. 
Finally, Rent-to-own Stores are outlets that offer credit to consum­
ers to purchase large appliances, electronics,  and furniture. Consumers 
agree to a series of weekly or monthly payments, but usually end up 
paying back two to three times the retail amount of the item. However, 
they don' t  own the product in full until the final payment, and if they 
default on their payments , the product must be returned and the con­
sumer is not compensated. Customers are thus hit with excessive interest 
rates ,  exceedingly high fees, or exorbitant prices for services or goods 
they end up paying two to three times as much as if they' d  paid the retail 
1 1  EZ Pawn, Cash America Pawn, Express Cash, Famous Pawn and First Cash Pawn. 
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price upfront. "According to the Consumer Federation of America, cus­
tomers with RTO contracts pay between $ 1 ,000 and $2,400 for a TV, 
stereo, or other major appliance worth as little as $200 used, and seldom 
more than $600 new." 1 2 
CONCLUSION 
Whether one patronizes a payday lender, a pawnshop, a check-cash­
ing outlet, or get a tax refund loan from a tax preparer like H&R Block or 
Jackson Hewitt, which is basically a way of borrowing one ' s  own 
money and pay high interest rates for it, all these examples point to a 
similar business model: taking advantage of vulnerable, misinformed, 
sometimes helpless customers, many of whom are ethnic minority cus­
tomers, and offering them predatory credit services, while pretending to 
be performing a form of community service and acting as much needed 
substitutes for an inadequate and faulty banking system. The ultimate 
irony is that for many of these fringe banking customers, these short-term 
loans may in fact be the cheapest option available, compared with the 
sometimes prohibitive overdraft protection fees offered by regular banks, 
or the astronomical credit card fees .  
In spite of existing legislation such as the Community Reinvestment 
Act of 1 977 which mandated that federally insured banks meet the credit 
needs of their entire communities, including low-income people, and 
thus prevent the redlining process,  segregation in the credit market, far 
from disappearing, has intensified, because the American banking indus­
try has become polarized between regular banks in the top tier of the 
system who cater to the wealthier and less risky customers, and a flour­
ishing market of second and third tier outlets which practice usury lend­
ing and take advantage of the more vulnerable .  We could describe what 
is taking place today as a form of redlining in reverse, one that still dis­
criminates against poor communities, only this time not by excluding 
them from credit, but by offering instead quick, easy, convenient access 
to plenty of credit products which tum out to be scandalously expensive 
and which ensnare them into a debt trap. This is not the way ethnic mi­
norities are going to build up equity. These communities don ' t  have ac­
cess to the safe, mainstream and asset-building kind of credit, and are 
steered toward the exploitative options instead. In the words of Howard 
Karger: "one set of rules for the rich, another set of nonrules for the 
poor" . 1 3 Meanwhile, the racial gap in access to fair credit continues 
unabated. 
1 2 Howard Karger, Shortchanged, Life and Debt in the Fringe Economy, Berrett-Koehler 
Publishers, 2005 . p.96. 
1 3 id. p.xi. 
